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 IN DEFENSE OF INTERNATIONAL ORDER:
 GROTIUS'S CRITIQUE OF MACHIAVELLISM
 W. J. KORAB-KARPOWICZ
 Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), Huigh de Groot in Dutch, lived during
 turbulent times in which politics mixed with religion. The emerging
 sovereign and mutually independent states of Europe were inces
 santly fighting over territorial, dynastic, and commercial matters, as
 well as over differences in religion. The Thirty Years War, arguably
 one of the most cruel and lawless wars in European history, broke out
 in 1618 as a result of religious quarrels. The sovereigns of Grotius's
 time did not consider themselves bound by international agreements,
 and they were rather unscrupulous in interpreting and applying them.
 They were thus followers of the doctrine of raison d'?tat and disciples
 of Niccol? Machiavelli, whose work The Prince taught them to break
 any treaty, when the advantages that had originally induced them to
 form it ceased to exist.
 Machiavelli never used the phrase ragione di stato (reason of
 state) or its French equivalent, raison d'?tat. Nevertheless, the con
 tention that, in order to maintain or protect the state, it is appropriate
 for a sovereign to engage in a morally reprehensible course of action,
 is central to his political theory. Under his influence, this view of
 international conduct became the main theme of an entire genre of
 sixteenth-century Italian political writings, the most notable contribu
 tion to which was Giovanni Botero's work Ragione di Stato.1 It was,
 however, in seventeenth-century France, in the policies of Cardinal
 Richelieu aimed at the furthering of the Catholic faith and the benefit
 of the Christian state, and later in Germany, that Machiavellian politi
 cal ideas came to prominence and contributed to a significant evolu
 tion of the doctrine of raison d'?tat. With the breakdown of the unity
 of western Christendom caused by the Reformation, the rise of the
 Correspondence to: Department of International Relations, Bilkent Uni
 versity, 06800 Ankara, Turkey.
 1 Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, vol. 1
 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 248.
 The Review of Metaphysics 60 (September 2006): 55-70. Copyright ? 2006 by The Review of
 Metaphysics
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 modern state system, and the expanding secularization of European
 culture, this doctrine lost its preoccupation with any religious ends
 and deteriorated into a materialistic ability for calculating what was
 necessary for the interest of the state. Frederick the Great (who
 called Machiavelli the enemy of mankind but closely followed his ad
 vice) expressed this doctrine as, "princes are slaves to their re
 sources, the interest of the state is their law, and this law is inviola
 ble."2 Raison d'?tat became the main principle of European interstate
 relations and served as a justification of the methods a number of
 statesmen felt obliged to affirm in their foreign policy practice.3
 These methods, outlined in The Prince, involved conquering either by
 force or fraud, destroying cities, putting to death anyone who could
 do harm, moving the inhabitants from one place to another, establish
 ing colonies, replacing old institutions with new ones, and extending
 the territory and power of the state at the expense of rivals. The ques
 tion of morality, in the sense of norms restraining states in their mu
 tual relations, either did not arise or was subordinated to the competi
 tive struggle for power.
 What ultimately counted for Machiavelli were not moral scruples
 or norms, but raison d'?tat, whatever is good for the state. Machia
 vellism has become associated with a certain kind of political behav
 ior in which expediency is placed above morality. This kind of behav
 ior existed long before Machiavelli and was debated long before him
 by political philosophers. The arguments of the Athenian envoys pre
 sented in the "Melian Dialogue" by Thucydides, of Thrasymachus in
 Plato's Republic, and of Carneades, to whom Grotius refers, all fur
 nish a great challenge to the classical view of the unity of politics and
 ethics. However, before Machiavelli, this amoral or immoral stream
 of thinking had never prevailed over the dominant political tradition
 of Western thought. It was only the Machiavellian justification of re
 sorting to evil as a legitimate means of achieving certain political ends
 that persuaded so many thinkers and political practitioners after him.
 2 On the influence of Machiavelli's thought on Frederick the Great and
 other statesmen, and on the development of the doctrine raison d'?tat by
 philosophers Fichte and Hegel, and German historians such as Leopold von
 Ranke and Heinrich von Treitschke, see Friedrich Meinecke, Machiavellism:
 The Doctrine of Raison d'?tat in Modern History, trans. Douglas Scott
 (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1998).
 3 Greg Russell, Hans J. Morgenthau and the Ethics of American State
 craft (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990), 9.
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 This justification was further carried on by the theorists of the doc
 trine of raison d'?tat. The tension between expediency and morality
 lost its validity in the sphere of politics. The concept of a double mo
 rality, private and public, was invented. Ethics was subjected to poli
 tics. The good of the state was interpreted as the highest moral value.
 National power was extended as a nation's right and duty. In the
 Marxist version of this doctrine, a superior type of morality was as
 signed to the revolutionary cause. In the name of such a "higher" mo
 rality, identified with the interest of the proletariat or of the state,
 grave crimes against humanity have been committed. Actions which
 employed violent, cruel, or otherwise customarily immoral means
 have been regarded as legitimate according to the exigencies of "pro
 gressive change."
 In this article I present Grotius's argument against raison d'?tat
 and his defense of the rule of law in international relations. His major
 work, De Jure Belli ac Pads (On the Law of War and Peace), does
 not contain any reference to the Florentine thinker. Nevertheless, it is
 principally against Machiavelli that Grotius directs his argument. He
 challenges the views of adherents of the doctrine of raison d'?tat who
 give rulers the license to disobey legal and moral norms whenever the
 vital interests of the state are at stake.
 I
 Grotius's Argument against Raison d'?tat. Drawing our atten
 tion to the value of international law, Grotius writes, in the Prolegom
 ena to De Jure Belli ac Pads: "Many hold, in fact, that the standard of
 justice which they insist upon in the case of individuals within the
 state is inapplicable to a nation or the ruler of a nation."4 He tells us
 that there are those who regard international law with contempt, "as
 having no reality except an empty name."5 Such writers consider that
 for a state nothing is unjust which is expedient and that the conduct of
 foreign policy cannot be performed without injustice. Powerful states
 4 Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pads, prol. ?22. My citations are from the
 following translation of the Latin edition of 1646: Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli
 ac Pads, trans. Francis W. Kelsey (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment
 for International Peace, 1925).
 5 De Jure, prol. ?3.
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 can afford to pursue their policies without regard to law and solely in
 the light of their own advantage. Grotius rejects these views. In hu
 manist fashion, instead of directly attacking his contemporary oppo
 nents, he makes his argument against Carneades (215-129 B.c.), a nat
 ural law critic and a classical representative of the belief that in
 international politics nothing is unjust which is expedient.
 Carneades' position can be summarized as follows. There is no
 universally valid natural law, discoverable by "right reason," which
 determines what is right and wrong. Natural law has no basis because
 all creatures, human beings and animals, are impelled by nature to
 pursue ends advantageous for themselves.6 Therefore, nothing is
 right or just by nature, and all laws are conventional. Human beings
 impose laws upon themselves for expediency, and such laws vary
 among different peoples and change at different times. Justice is de
 rived from utility and is based only on calculation of the advantage of
 living together in a particular society. Such advantage is apparent in
 the case of citizens who, singly, are powerless to protect themselves.
 But strong individuals or powerful states, since they contain in them
 selves all things required for their own protection, do not need jus
 tice.7 They need acknowledge no higher law but their own strength.
 The notion of justice is thus not applicable to relations between
 states, or if there is justice, "it is supreme folly, since one does vio
 lence to one's own interests if one consults the advantage of others."8
 In short, to use the phrase of Reinhold Niebuhr, Carneades is one "in
 the long line of moral cynics in the field of international relations"
 who know no law beyond self-interest.9
 To Grotius, justice is not folly. He defends natural law as follows.
 First, he attacks the view that every animal is impelled by nature to
 seek only its own good. Even animals can restrain their self-serving
 appetites, to the advantage of other animals, most obviously their off
 spring.10 Sheep dogs, for example, go in advance of their flocks, fight
 ing till death if necessary, to protect the flocks and shepherds from
 6De Jure, prol. ?5.
 7De Jure, prol. ?22.
 8De Jure, prol. ?5.
 9 Reinhold Niebuhr, The Children of Light and the Children of Dark
 ness: A Vindication of Democracy and a Critique of Its Traditional De
 fense (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1960), 8.
 10 De Jure, prol. ?7.
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 harm. If this is the case with animals, it is even more so with humans,
 who are rational creatures. Humans can benefit not only themselves
 but also others by the ability to recognize others' needs. They can re
 frain, even with inconvenience to themselves, from doing harm.11
 They have been endowed with the faculties of knowing good and evil
 and of acting according to general principles. What is characteristic of
 human beings is "an overwhelming desire for society; that is, for social
 life not of any and every sort, but peaceful, and organized according to
 the measure of intelligence."12 They neither were nor are, by nature,
 wild, unsociable beings. On the contrary, it is the corruption of their
 nature which makes them so.13 Further, if humans are naturally so
 cial, their natural sociability should be protected against acts which
 destroy peace in society, such as the violation of others' property.
 Laws established to provide an order in society are thus not merely
 conventional but have their basis in human sociability. The law of na
 ture, as it appears from the Prolegomena, is the law which conforms
 with the social nature of humans and the preservation of social order;
 it is the law which applies to all humans. To its sphere belong such
 standards as not taking that which belongs to another, the restoration
 of damage, the obligation to fulfill promises, the reparation of injury,
 and the right to inflict penalties.14 It exists independently of any will
 and cannot be changed by any authority whatsoever, whether divine
 or human.
 Human natural inclination to one another, sociability, or fellow
 ship?in short, human social nature and not mere expediency?is the
 foundation of natural law: "a dictate of right reason which points out
 that an act, according to whether it is or is not in conformity with
 rational nature, has in it a quality of moral baseness or moral neces
 sity."15 Nevertheless, insofar as we have all been created weak and
 lack many things needed to live properly, laws which have their ulti
 mate source in human sociability are reinforced by expediency.16
 Grotius divides law into natural law and volitional law. Positive
 11 De Jure 1.1.11. I follow a standard form of reference (book, chapter,
 section).
 12 De Jure, prol. ?6.
 13De Jure 1.1.12.
 14 De Jure, prol. ?6.
 15 De Jure 3.11.16.
 16 De Jwe, prol. ?16.
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 volitional laws, which emanate from the power of the state but have
 their ultimate point of reference in natural law, have always some ad
 vantage in view. Insofar as they are based on citizens' choice and con
 sent, the laws of each state have in view the benefit of the whole soci
 ety. For this reason, he argues, it is wrong to ridicule justice as folly.
 A citizen who obeys the law is not foolish, "even though, out of regard
 for that law, he may be obliged to forgo certain things advantageous
 for himself."17 By violating a law of his country in order to maximize
 utility and obtain immediate advantage, the individual destroys the
 common welfare, by which the advantages of himself and his poster
 ity are secured. The same applies to international law that has in view
 "the advantage, not of particular states, but of the great society of
 states."18
 Grotius replaces the double standard of conduct for states in
 their internal affairs and in their foreign affairs, characteristic of poli
 tics of raison d'?tat, with a clear-cut parallelism. The conduct of na
 tions is compared to the conduct of individuals. The "nation is not
 foolish which does not press its own advantage to the point of disre
 garding the laws common to all countries."19 Although law is not
 founded upon expediency alone, no state can disregard potential ben
 efits of international cooperation. He stresses mutual interdepen
 dence of states. In a mutually interdependent world, there is no state
 so powerful that it may not some time need the help of others outside
 itself, either for purposes of trade, or even to ward off the forces of
 many foreign nations united against it.20 No state is free to act unlaw
 fully. In disobeying the law of nations because of temporary profit to
 itself, the state separates itself from international society and hence
 undermines the foundation of its own security.
 Grotius challenges the view that laws are merely conventional
 and justice a matter of mere expediency. He asserts the essential
 identity of legal and moral rules governing the conduct of states and
 individuals, and he traces the source of these rules to the law of na
 ture. He does not identify international law with natural law, since
 the latter represents a body of moral rules known to all civilized hu
 man beings, while the former is a body of rules that have been ac
 17 De Jure, prol. ?18.
 18 De Jure, prol. ?17.
 19 De Jure, prol. ?18.
 20De Jure, prol. ?22.
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 cepted as obligatory by the consent of all or many states. However,
 the law of nature is for him the ever-present source for supplementing
 the voluntary law of nations, and for judging its adequacy in the light
 of ethics and reason.21 It provides criteria against which the mere will
 and practice of states can be measured. At the same time, he draws
 our attention to the utility of international law. While the proponents
 of the doctrine of raison d'?tat argue that state interests override cus
 tomary moral rules and international norms, Grotius attempts to show
 that this way of looking at national interest is the equivalent of looking
 into the wrong end of a telescope. It establishes a false dichotomy be
 tween the interests of particular states and the interests of the whole
 international community. It fails to appreciate how important interna
 tional norms are when it comes to the constitution of state interests.
 Even if no immediate advantage were to be derived from the keeping
 of the law, Grotius says, it would be a mark of wisdom, not of folly, to
 allow ourselves to be drawn toward that to which we feel our nature
 leads.22 Respecting international law and promoting international or
 der can bring long-term benefits to all nations.
 II
 Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello. For adherents of the doctrine of
 raison d'?tat, ethical and legal norms are suspended by the necessities
 (such as the necessity to survive or secure power) which states con
 front in international relations. The stern necessities of the state jus
 tify doing evil. In the affirmation of "reason of state," the claim to an
 unrestricted right to war is thus the most important. War becomes the
 right of sovereign states and the very symbol of their sovereignty.
 Moreover, since war is always an instrument of state policy, as Carl
 von Clausewitz points out, it is limited insofar as policy is limited;
 however, once a state decides to pursue a policy of conquest and is no
 longer prepared to be bound by any established norms, it would fight a
 total and unconstrained war.23 Grotius disputes these views. For him,
 21 Hersch Lauterpacht, "The Grotian Tradition in International Law,"
 British Yearbook for International Law 23 (1946): 1-53.
 22 De Jure, prol. ?18.
 23 Restraints on War: Studies in the Limitation of Armed Conflict, ed.
 Michael Howard (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 6.
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 states are composed of individual human beings24?a basic reason
 why their behavior is not subject to impersonal forces of necessity but
 ultimately always depends upon human decisions. States are not dis
 orderly crowds but associations. As such, they are, as a rule, gov
 erned by individuals who reach decisions after deliberations and are
 capable of forming judgments on ethical and legal issues confronting
 them. Moreover, since states are collections of persons, they are sub
 ordinated to natural law arising from the nature of man as a rational
 and as a social being.25 Hence, their behavior is subject to limitations.
 To control and limit war is thus not inherently impossible. Grotius at
 tempts to limit and restrain war in two ways: first, by his just war doc
 trine which puts severe limitations on the reasons for which war may
 be fought; second, by putting legal restraints on its conduct.26 The
 two phrases: jus ad bellum (justice of war) and jus in bello (justice in
 war) refer respectively to these two cases.
 There are three views concerning the legitimacy of war. First,
 there is the pacifist view that no act of war is legitimate. Second,
 there is the militaristic or Machiavellian view that any war that bene
 fits the state is legitimate. Third, there is the legalistic or Grotian view
 that there is a distinction between just and unjust causes of war, and
 that some wars are therefore legitimate and others not. The pacifist
 and militarist views are both inimical to international order. The
 former rejects the violence that is necessary to uphold international
 order against attempts to subvert it; the latter admits violence of a
 sort that destroys international order.27 For Grotius, the use of force
 is in no way discordant with social human nature. "The right reason
 and the nature of society prohibit not all force," he says, "but only that
 which is repugnant to society, by depriving another of his right."28
 Convinced that there is a common law among nations, which is valid
 alike for war and in war, he attempts to provide an alternative against
 both extremes, pacifism and militarism, so that humankind may not
 believe either that nothing or anything is allowable.29 He denies the
 24 De Jure 2.1.17.
 25De Jure, prol. ?26.
 26De Jure, prol. ?25.
 27 Hedley Bull, "The Grotian Conception of International Society," in
 Diplomatie Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics,
 ed. Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (London: Allen and Unwin, 1966),
 54.
 28De Jure 1.2..1.
 29De Jure, prol. ?29.
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 state the right to resort to war except in pursuit of a just cause: "No
 other just cause for undertaking war can there be excepting injury re
 ceived."30 He limits the justifiable causes of war to defense, recovery
 of property, and inflicting of punishment. In addition, he devotes an
 entire chapter of the De Jure Belli ac Pads to an enumeration of vari
 ous causes of unjust war.31 He accepts as a just cause of war neither
 the desire for richer lands nor the desire to rule others against their
 own will on the pretext that it is for their good. Wars can be justly
 waged against neither those who refuse to accept our ideology or reli
 gion nor those who err in its interpretation. Furthermore, in elaborat
 ing the right of self-defense, Grotius rejects the claims of the war of
 prevention. He claims that the notion that "the mere possibility of be
 ing attacked confers the right to attack is abhorrent to every principle
 of equity. Human life exists in such conditions that complete security
 is never guaranteed to us."32 In another part of the book, he says
 plainly that to "authorize hostilities as a defensive measure, they must
 arise from the necessity which right apprehensions create: there must
 be a clear evidence not only of the power, but also of the intentions of
 the formidable state."33
 In book 3 of De Jure Belli ac Pads, Grotius discusses what was
 considered to be just in war under the law of nations of his day: killing
 and wounding enemies, devastating, acquiring captured goods, enslav
 ing prisoners of war, and obtaining supreme governing power. How
 ever, he does not approve of these practices. In chapters 11-16, which
 include chapters on admonition of temperamenta belli (restraints on
 war), he aims at providing rules for minimizing bloodshed. First, he
 seeks to restrain the right to kill. He states that no one may be killed
 intentionally except as a just punishment or by necessity, when there
 is no other way to protect life or property. Next, he specifies the cate
 gories of people who may not be killed. These include such noncom
 batants as children, women (unless they are fighting in place of men),
 old men, members of the clergy, men of letters, farmers, merchants,
 and artisans. He also argues that the lives of those combatants who
 surrender unconditionally or beg for mercy, and thus no longer pose a
 threat, should be spared. Grotius's argument in respect of devastating
 30 De Jure 2.1.1.
 31 De Jure 2.12.
 32 De Jure 2.1.17.
 33De Jure 2.22.5.
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 and pillaging is similar. Devastation can be undertaken to reduce the
 strength of the enemy. But devastation for devastation's sake is ab
 surd and should be avoided. It is not allowed if, as a result of occupa
 tion, the land and its produce are effectively withheld from the enemy.
 Grotius also insists that the powers involved in conflict should refrain
 from destroying works of art, especially those devoted to sacred pur
 poses. He believes that reverence for things sacred requires that sa
 cred buildings and their furnishing be preserved. To evaluate the
 value of temperamenta he does not only refer to the law of nature.
 He also supports his emphasis on moderation in war by a prudential
 argument.34 To refrain from indiscriminate killing, and from destroy
 ing and pillaging property, he argues, increases the likeness of one's
 own victory by depriving the enemy of the great weapon of despair.
 De Jure Belli ac Pads was read widely in the European intellec
 tual circles of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and it must
 have then exerted some influence on the process by which the sever
 ity of war in Europe was mitigated. Many rules and basic ideas of the
 law of war established in the late ninetieth and early twentieth centu
 ries, especially by the Hague and Geneva conventions, follow
 Grotius's restraints on the conduct of war. Nevertheless, his just war
 doctrine was not accepted in his day and for three centuries thereaf
 ter. Prior to the changes introduced to international law in the after
 math of the First World War, states had the right to resort to war not
 only to defend their legal rights but also in order to destroy rights of
 other states. This idea of the unqualified prerogative of states to re
 sort to war as an instrument of national policy was opposed by the
 just war tradition that denied the absolute right to war and differenti
 ated between wars which, in law, were just and those which were not.
 Grotius made a significant contribution to this tradition.35 In the Cov
 enant of the League of Nations, established in 1919 by the Treaty of
 Versailles and dissolved in 1946, lawful resort to war was diminished
 for the League's member states. International law on the right to re
 sort to war was further developed by the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928,
 outlawing war as an instrument of national policy, and the U.N. Chap
 34De Jure 3.12.8.
 35 See G. I. A. D. Draper, "Grotius' Place in the Development of Legal
 Ideas about War," in Hugo Grotius and International Relations, ed. Hedley
 Bull, Benedict Kingsbury, and Adam Roberts (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
 1990), 202.
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 ter of 1945. The provisions of the U.N. Chapter, aiming at providing a
 system of collective security, extend beyond Grotius's position. How
 ever, they preserve his basic idea that states may use unilateral force
 only for the purpose of self-defense, and not for the pursuit of their
 foreign-policy objectives.
 Ill
 Human Rights and Intervention. Against advocates of the doc
 trine of raison d'?tat, Grotius argues that "there is a common law
 among nations, valid for war and in war."36 His contribution to inter
 national relations theory is the idea that the binding force of law can
 be preserved in an anarchic international environment. Thus, he lays
 foundations for a universal international order dedicated to peaceful
 cooperation between equal and mutually independent sovereign
 states. Nevertheless, in addition to promoting the rule of law in inter
 state relations, Grotius sets before the international community an
 other goal of protecting people from harm and of promoting the pro
 tection of basic human rights. In the chapter "On Punishments," he
 says:
 The fact must also be recognized that kings, and those who possess
 rights equal to kings, have the right of demanding punishments not only
 on account of injuries committed, against themselves or their subjects,
 but also on account of injuries which do not directly affect them but ex
 cessively violate the law of nature or of nations in regard to any persons
 whatsoever.37
 Central to Grotius's thought about war is the insistence that pri
 vate war, violence between families, groups, or cities is forbidden.
 "No war can be made but by the authority of the sovereign in each
 state."38 Grotius is thus against nonstate violence, and he has been
 criticized because of his disapproval of the right of resistance to op
 pression. He asserts that a rebellion in the form of a war of liberation
 is not permitted under natural law. To recognize a right of resistance
 for him is contrary to the purpose for which the state is formed, that
 is, the maintenance of public peace.39 Nevertheless, he adds to his
 36 De Jure, prol. ?24.
 31 De Jure 2.20.40.
 36 De Jure 1.3.5.
 39 ?eJttre 1.4.2-5.
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 position a few important qualifications. Right of popular resistance
 exists when rulers openly demonstrate themselves enemies of the
 whole people or attempt to usurp parts of sovereign power not be
 longing to them. Further, he permits nonviolent struggle and defends
 such individual rights as the right to defend one's person and prop
 erty, the right to refuse to carry arms in an unjust or even morally
 doubtful war, and the right to purchase necessities of life, such as
 food, clothing, or medicine, at a reasonable price.40 He is also clearly
 ahead of his time when he discusses humanitarian intervention. Not
 withstanding his reluctance to sanction wars of national liberation, he
 considers the prevention of the maltreatment by a state of its subjects
 a just reason for war.
 Based on the notion of state sovereignty over its own territory,
 international law has traditionally opposed not only unilateral inter
 vention in the domestic affairs of one country by another but also col
 lective action. The only exceptions are grave threats to the peace and
 security of other states and egregious and potentially genocidal viola
 tions of human rights. While addressing the dilemma of whether the
 sovereignty of a state should be respected or the rights of the individ
 uals within the state protected, Grotius offers a basic principle by
 which humanitarian intervention can be justified. He acknowledges
 the established rule that "every sovereign is supreme judge in his own
 kingdom and over his own subjects, in whose disputes no foreign
 power can justly interfere."41 However, he argues that the state that is
 oppressive and egregiously violates basic human rights forfeits its
 moral claim to full sovereignty. When the rulers provoke their people
 to despair and resistance by unheard-of cruelties, having themselves
 abandoned all laws of nature, they lose the rights of independent sov
 ereigns and can no longer claim the privilege of the law of nations.
 For Grotius, humanitarian intervention is therefore a kind of interna
 tional equivalent of domestic law enforcement. Governments that en
 gage in acts that allow other states to intervene in their domestic af
 fairs for humanitarian purposes are considered by him to be criminal
 governments. While Grotius generally denies the oppressed the right
 of resistance, he permits a foreign state to intervene, through war, on
 their behalf. "Admitting that it would be fraught with the greatest
 dangers if the subjects were allowed to redress grievances by force of
 40De Jure 2.2.19.
 41 De Jure 2.25.8.
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 arms, it does not necessarily follow that other powers are prohibited
 from giving them assistance when laboring under grievous oppres
 sion."42
 Grotius's argument for intervention is based on the assumption of
 one common nature which humans have and which alone is sufficient
 to oblige people to assist each other. Human social and rational na
 ture is the source of natural law and a foundation of human rights. In
 the sense that pertains to an individual human being, "right (ius) is a
 moral quality, annexed to the person, justly entitling him to possess
 some particular privilege, or to perform particular acts."43 Although
 Grotius's list of human rights violations and barbaric acts may be dif
 ferent from today's, he asserts as a matter of principle that members
 of the international community are not obliged to respect the sover
 eignty of a state which engages in acts of cruelty and violates human
 rights. Whoever commits a crime, whether a criminal individual or a
 criminal nation, by the very act can be considered to fall into the level
 of brutes and can be regarded as inferior to anyone else.44 Those hu
 man beings who break basic rules of humanity and renounce natural
 law are wild beasts rather than humans, and against them a just war
 can be fought. "The most just war is against savage beasts, the next
 against men who are like beasts."45 However, Grotius does not license
 intervention everywhere to everyone, and he qualifies his argument
 with prudential considerations. Since a state's own existence and
 preservation is the object of greater value and prior consideration
 than the welfare and security of other states, "no one is bound to give
 assistance or protection when it will be attended with evident dan
 ger."46 In his view, national responsibility, the obligation of the gov
 ernment to its own citizens, is regarded as most important, and it
 takes precedence before cosmopolitan responsibility for all humans.
 Our common nature, he suggests, tells us that if possible something
 should be done to stop human suffering on a mass scale wherever it
 occurs. But governments should always protect their own people first
 and avoid taking unnecessary risks with their welfare; only then can
 they try to help whomever else they can. "No ally is bound to assist in
 the prosecution of schemes which afford no possible prospect of a
 42 De Jure 2.25.6.
 43DeJure 1.1.4.
 44 ?e Jure 2.20.3.
 4^ De Jure 2.20.40.
 46Z)e Jwre 2.25.7.
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 happy termination."47 Intervention is justified only if the military risk
 is not high and there is a reasonable chance of success.
 Political realists are critical of intervention, arguing that states
 act only when it is in their interest to do so. They argue that disre
 garding the rights of sovereignty of other states to promote human
 rights may lead to an undermining of peace and order. Grotius does
 not deny self-interest in international politics. However, he believes
 that states can identify their interests not only with narrow national
 goals but also with a greater task of the preservation of international
 order.48 In such case, cosmopolitan responsibility for other humans
 and the punishment of rogue states (especially in situations where hu
 man rights violations result in grave threats to peace for neighboring
 states) is not contrary to national interest. Nevertheless, as a word of
 warning, Grotius says that "wars which are undertaken to inflict pun
 ishment are under suspicion of being unjust, unless crimes are very
 atrocious and evident."49 The danger that a humanitarian intervention
 can be used as the cover of ambitious designs, "by which no faults of
 kings but their power and authority will be assailed," cannot be com
 pletely removed. "But right does not lose its nature from being in the
 hands of wicked men."50 Grotius anticipates the idea, which underlies
 the system of collective security of the United Nations, that to avoid
 the situation that under a pretended humanitarian intervention there
 will be an interest of a single state to undertake a military action
 against another, the process of judgment whether or not to undertake
 such action must be multinational.51 Collectively approved action can
 correct for self-interested interventions covered by a thin cloak of hu
 manitarianism.
 IV
 Old and New Challenges to the Grotian Order. Under Grotius's
 influence, international law changed from its old meaning of a set of
 customs which were discovered to be common to the juridical prac
 47De Jure 2.25.4.
 48 De Jure, prol. ?17.
 49 De Jure 2.20.43.
 b0De Jure 2.25.8.
 51 Michael J. Smith, "Humanitarian Intervention: An Overview of the
 Ethical Issues," in Ethics and International Affairs: A Reader, 2d ed. (Wash
 ington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1999), 291.
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 tice of many different peoples, to a body of rules regulating the rela
 tions between sovereign states. He posited the idea of the interna
 tional rule of law, even in warfare, and thus provided the foundation
 for a universal legal order applicable to all nations, an order whose
 purpose is to encourage cooperation between states and reduce the
 risk of a conflict arising among them. Yet, just as his ideas were fre
 quently discussed, quoted, and admired, they were also fiercely at
 tacked and described as Utopian or unrealistic. Challenges have been
 made to not only his idea of international legal order but also his con
 cept of fixed moral standards derived from natural law, by which poli
 cies and political actions could be judged.
 The initial challenge came from Hobbes, Grotius's younger con
 temporary. Although he does not mention Grotius by name, in his Le
 viathan, first published in 1651, Hobbes makes a formidable attack on
 the views underlying Grotius's lifework. He argues that there is no so
 ciety between states because there is no common power, authority,
 and law; that states have an absolute and unlimited sovereign power
 and, as a matter of sovereign prerogative, are entitled to wage war;
 that their mutual relations appear to be those of perpetual conflict;
 that going to war is simply striving to enforce our will as a people on
 another people; that peace is only a breathing time; that ethical norms
 do not hold at war and consequently crimes during war do not exist.
 Hobbes joins the camp of those who dismiss the idea of international
 norms founded on natural law. In different ways, Machiavellians,
 Hobbesians, Hegelians, and Marxists all agree.
 By subjecting Grotius's ideas to criticism, Hobbes voiced the pre
 vailing international practice of governments of his day. In many
 cases these ideas were read in a way that were contrary to Grotius's
 own intentions. Grotius was praised equally by hawks and doves. His
 ideas could gratify the high-minded because they sounded lofty and
 pointed out a way which could reasonably lead to a more peaceful
 world, while in practice, they could not restrict the struggle for power
 between European states and their endeavor to subject non-European
 people to their authority.52 Grotius's just war doctrine was all too of
 ten used instrumentally by hardliners and militarists to justify the
 right to start war. His right to intervention provided too readily a pre
 text for brigands of all kinds to subjugate foreign peoples.
 52 B. V. A. R?ling, "Are Grotius' Ideas Obsolete in an Expanded World?"
 in Hugo Grotius and International Relations, ed. Hedley Bull, Benedict
 Kingsbury, and Adam Roberts (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 297.
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 The age of Grotius was a time of national arms build-up, not arms
 restriction. The era of colonial conquests by European nations had
 just begun. Yet even in today's postcolonial era, individuals and na
 tions are contending with some of the same important questions that
 were faced in the seventeenth century. Under what conditions can
 states punish another state or undertake a humanitarian intervention?
 Can rules and norms of international society provide restraint against
 the potential egoism of states? Do they contribute to greater coopera
 tion and peace among states? Are rules and norms merely an expres
 sion of a particular interpretation of national or class interests at a
 particular time?
 The value of Grotius's work is not that it provides answers to all
 these questions. He is, however, an important voice in the debate
 about the character of international politics. He wrestled with prob
 lems which continue to concern us. It is his conviction that people do
 not conduct their foreign policies independently of their cultural val
 ues. The international legal order which he envisions is not compati
 ble with societies in which the individual human being is not recog
 nized as the primary principle but is rather reduced to a member of a
 tribe, a nation, or a class; in which the essential elements that consti
 tute human nature, human rationality and sociability, are not recog
 nized; and in which natural law is either not acknowledged or not un
 derstood as a moral law. Those core values and norms of Western
 civilization have been under a constant threat of militaristic ideolo
 gies. Upon their sustenance, the future of the present Grotian global
 order, based on rule of law in international relations, ultimately de
 pends.
 Bilkent University
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